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Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Current challenges and opportunities. 
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Abstract:  
In its 2011 report “Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales” (Law Com 
No.325), the Law Commission recommended that the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal 
proceedings should be governed by a new statutory regime comprising a new statutory reliability 
test in combination with codification and refinement of existing common law principles relating to 
“assistance”, “expertise” and “impartiality”. The Government declined to enact the Law 
Commission’s draft Bill due to a lack of certainty as to whether the additional costs incurred would 
be offset by savings. Instead the Government invited the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee 
(CrimPRC) to consider amendments to the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR) to introduce, as far as 
possible, the spirit of the Law Commission’s recommendations. The consequent amendments to 
CrimPR Part 33 (now CrimPR Part 19) in combination with the making of the new Practice Direction 
CrimPD 33A (now CrimPD 19A) by the Lord Chief Justice, resulted in what he described in his 2014 
Criminal Bar Association Kalisher Lecture as “a novel way of implementing an excellent Report”. This 
paper considers the possible evolution of the common law in light of these amendments, the 
challenges associated with adopting such a novel approach to reform and the potential 
opportunities for the improvement of expert evidence in criminal proceedings that the changes 
were intended to create.  
 
Introduction 
In 2009 the Law Commission published its consultation paper “The Admissibility of Expert Evidence 
in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales”.1 This consultation, to which Northumbria Centre for 
Evidence and Criminal Justice Studies responded, had been catalysed by a report of the House of 
                                                          
1 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 190 (2009). 
Commons’ Science and Technology Committee, published in 2005.2 The Law Commission “shared 
the Committee’s concern that expert opinion evidence was being admitted in criminal proceedings 
too readily, with insufficient scrutiny”.3  In its resultant 2011 report “Expert Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings in England and Wales”, the Law Commission recommended that the admissibility of 
expert evidence in criminal proceedings should be governed by a new statutory regime comprising a 
new statutory reliability test in combination with codification and refinement of existing common 
law principles relating to “assistance”, “expertise” and “impartiality”.4 Other recommendations 
related to pre-trial disclosure, court appointed experts and amendments to the Criminal Procedure 
Rules (CrimPR).5 The Law Commission recognised, however, that these proposed developments 
would not in themselves remedy the problems they had identified in relation to expert evidence. 
Consequently it emphasised the importance of other parallel changes, such as appropriate 
regulatory schemes to ensure minimum standards, a more critical approach on the part of the 
judiciary and appropriate training for judges and lawyers.6  
The Government declined to enact the Law Commission’s draft Bill because, whilst the Law 
Commission’s impact assessment recognised that implementation of its recommendations would 
result in the added expense of holding additional pre-trial hearings7, there was a lack of certainty as 
to whether the additional costs incurred would be offset by savings (via, for example, fewer or 
shorter trials, reduction in expert’s fees and fewer appeals).8  Whilst the result of the Government’s 
decision was to leave in place the common law principles that govern the admissibility of expert 
evidence in criminal proceedings, the Government invited the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee 
(CrimPRC) to consider amendments to the CrimPR which it believed “could increase the likelihood of 
the trial judge and the opposing party, where appropriate, challenging expert evidence” and  “would 
go some way towards reducing the risk of unsafe convictions as a result of unchallenged 
inappropriate or unreliable expert evidence”.9 The consequent amendments to CrimPR Part 33 (now 
CrimPR Part 19) in combination with the making of the new Practice Direction CrimPD 33A (now 
CrimPD 19A) by the Lord Chief Justice, resulted in what he described in the 2014 Criminal Bar 
                                                          
2 Forensic Science on Trial, Seventh Report (2004–2005) HC 96-1. 
3 Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales, LAW COM No 325 at [1.2].  
4 ibid. at [1.37-1.38].    
5 ibid. at [1.41]. 
6 ibid. at [1.42-1.43]. 
7 ibid. at 165.  
8 Ministry of Justice (2013) The Government's response to the Law Commission Report: Expert evidence in 
criminal proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 325) at [3]. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/260369/govt-resp-experts-
evidence.pdf (accessed 30/01/2016). 
9 ibid. at [4-5]. 
Association Kalisher Lecture as “a novel way of implementing an excellent Report”.10 The Lord Chief 
Justice believed that these changes in combination with developments at common law and the work 
of the Advocacy Training Council (now the Inns of Court College of Advocacy (ICCA)) to develop 
relevant guidance and training for advocates meant that the bulk of the Law Commission’s 
recommendations had been implemented.11  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the principles that currently govern the admissibility of 
expert evidence in criminal proceedings, the provisions of CrimPR Part 19 and CrimPD 19A and the 
Law Commissions’ recommendations in order to identify key areas in relation to which additional 
clarification by the appellate courts, by amendments to CrimPD 19A  and/or to CrimPR Part 19 itself 
would be desirable. The paper is divided into six main sections.  
The first section considers the common law test that governs the admissibility of expert evidence in 
criminal proceedings and whether that test now effectively includes a reliability limb, acknowledges 
that admissibility challenges should not become automatic and recognises that, when admissibility is 
to be challenged, appropriate pre-trial case management processes should take place. The second 
section emphasises the importance of such case management in ensuring that the jury’s attention is 
focussed upon the relevant issues. The third section recognises that even where the evidence of an 
expert witness is relevant to an issue in the proceedings it is only admissible if it provides 
information that is likely to be outside the court’s knowledge and experience and that this rule can 
also limit the nature of the evidence that an expert witness who has been called should be 
permitted to give. The fourth section demonstrates that expert witness competence may be of 
relevance not only when determining whether a witness should be permitted to give expert 
evidence but also when determining the nature of that evidence which an expert witness should be 
permitted to give and identifies provisions of the CrimPR that are of significance in the context of 
expert witness competence or credibility. The fifth section concerns the extent to which the 
common law reliability test on which the guidance in the new CrimPD 19A is based may be informed 
not only by the guidance provided in the new Practice Direction itself but also by information 
provided in compliance with relevant provisions of the CrimPR and, potentially, by additional 
guidance that may be derived from the Law Commission’s recommendations. The final section 
accepts that impartiality does not form a condition precedent to the admissibility of expert evidence 
at common law, identifies provisions of the CrimPR which concern the expert’s duty to the court, 
                                                          
10 Lord Thomas CJ (Baron Thomas of Cwmgiedd) (2014) The future of forensic science in criminal trials: 2014 
Criminal Bar Association Kalisher Lecture at [17]. Available at: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/kalisher-lecture-expert-evidence-oct-14.pdf (accessed 30/01/2016). 
11 ibid. 
considers possible pathways via which admissibility challenges based on expert witness bias could 
potentially be founded and acknowledges that the most viable means of challenging expert witness 
impartiality may well remain that of conducting a well-formulated cross-examination strategy.  
This paper is based upon an Old Bailey Lecture that was given to the Criminal Bar Association on 
Tuesday March 1 2016. 
What are the components of the common law admissibility test and when is the court required to 
determine the admissibility of expert evidence? 
CrimPD 19A recognises that the common law principles that govern the admissibility of expert 
opinion evidence in the criminal context are that the evidence must be “relevant to a matter in 
issue in the proceedings”, that it must be “needed to provide the court with information likely to be 
outside the court’s own knowledge and experience” and that the witness who is to be called to give 
the expert evidence must be “competent to give that opinion”.12 Additionally, the Practice 
Direction13  extracts from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v Dlugosz14  the proposition that 
“in determining the issue of admissibility, the court must be satisfied that there is a sufficiently 
reliable scientific basis for the evidence to be admitted. If there is then the court leaves the opposing 
views to be tested before the jury”.15  The extent to which reliability forms part of the criteria for the 
admissibility of expert evidence will be examined in detail below. 
Reliability – the development of a common law reliability test? 
At common law the reliability (or otherwise) of evidence tendered by an expert witness has 
historically been treated as a matter for the jury with a consequent reduction in the weight 
apportioned to “unreliable” expert evidence.16 Such an approach was justified on the basis that 
juries should not be denied “…the advantages to be gained from new techniques and new advances 
in science”17. Although the common law did not preclude reliability as a criterion for the admission 
of expert evidence the threshold set was a low one.  The Court of Appeal in R v Luttrell18 identified 
“…that so long as a field is sufficiently well-established to pass the ordinary tests of relevance and 
reliability, then no enhanced test of admissibility should be applied…”.19   Indeed in R v Reed20 the 
                                                          
12 CrimPD 33A.1. 
13 CrimPD 33A.4. 
14 [2013] 1 Cr. App. R. 32 
15 ibid. per Sir John Thomas P at [11]. 
16 See for example: R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr.App.R. 161 , 165; R v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr.App.R. 195, para.23.; R v 
Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 31 
17 R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 425, 430  
18 Above n.16 
19 ibid. at 37 (italics added) 
Court of Appeal confirmed the absence of an enhanced reliability test and endorsed the approach 
taken in previous cases.21  
 
This “laissez faire” approach to the admission of expert opinion evidence was criticised by the Law 
Commission which favoured the creation of a “more stringent reliability test”.22 Clause 1(2) of the 
Law Commission’s draft Bill23 proposed the creation of an admissibility criterion based on whether 
the expert opinion evidence was “sufficiently reliable”, to be determined with reference to a 
number of factors contained in Clause 4 of the Bill. Although the provisions in the draft Bill were 
never enacted it is noteworthy that the concept of “sufficient reliability” is one that the Court of 
Appeal had previously considered in the context of expert opinion evidence on a number of 
occasions.24 Again in R v Reed25 the court identified that: 
 
“If the reliability of the scientific basis for the evidence is challenged, the court will consider 
whether there is a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for that evidence to be admitted, but, 
if satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for the evidence to be admitted, 
then it will leave the opposing views to be tested in the trial.”26 
 
The Lord Chief Justice in his 2014 Kalisher Lecture to the Criminal Bar Association opined that, 
notwithstanding the failure to enact a statutory admissibility test, the common law had already 
evolved to incorporate “sufficient reliability” as a requirement for the admission of expert 
evidence.27 This principle developed out of what the Lord Chief Justice described as “a series of cases 
largely arising out of the use of Low Template DNA [which] established the requirement that the 
court can only admit expert evidence if it is reliable”.28 This position has been expressly incorporated 
into CrimPD 19A by the inclusion of the reference to R v Dlugosz29 as authority for the proposition 
that expert opinion evidence must have a “sufficiently reliable scientific basis”.30  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
20 [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. 23 
21 See for example; R v Clarke, above n.17; R v Luttrell, above n.16 
22 Law Com No. 325 at [3.3 -3.5]  
23 Above n.3 at p.146 
24 See for example R v Dallagher n.16; R v Reed n.20; R v Ahmed [2011] EWCA Crim 184  
25 Above n.20 
26  ibid. at [111] 
27 Baron Thomas of Cwmgiedd, above, n.10 at [19] 
28 Baron Thomas of Cwmgiedd, above, n.10 at [19]. As regards the relevant series of cases, see R v Reed n.20, R 
v Broughton [2010] EWCA Crim 549, R v Weller [2010] EWCA Crim 1085, R v C [2010] EWCA Crim 2578 and R v 
Dlugosz n.14 (all DNA cases) and see, also, R v Atkins [2010] 1 Cr App R 8 (facial mapping) and R v T [2011] 1 Cr 
App R 9 (footwear marks).  
29 Above n.14 
30 CrimPD 19A.4  
 Unfortunately, CrimPD 19A does not make clear whether it was drafted upon the basis that the 
principle stated in Dlugosz31 now effectively forms a discrete fourth limb of the common law 
admissibility test or whether the guidance which CrimPD 19A provides for the courts when they are 
required to determine the reliability of expert opinion evidence is guidance that they are intended to 
take into account when determining whether the traditional three limbs of the common law 
admissibility test have been satisfied.  Tony Ward takes the latter view, suggesting that “[e]xpert 
evidence…is admissible if it is 'sufficiently reliable' to satisfy these three tests” but commenting that 
“[t]he Practice Direction does not tell us which of the three tests is to be applied or how they are to 
be interpreted”.32  Indeed, Ward regards it as questionable whether the series of cases that the Lord 
Chief Justice referred to in his lecture developed the law as significantly as the Lord Chief Justice 
asserted.33   
 
It is suggested that examination of the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal in combination with the 
fact that the Law Commission had envisaged that the guidance now embodied in CrimPD 19A would 
operate alongside a distinct reliability limb and the Lord Chief Justice’s view expressed in his lecture 
that the common law now encompasses a requirement that expert opinion evidence can only be 
admitted if it is reliable, suggests that the Court of Appeal is likely in future to treat sufficiency of 
reliability as a discrete admissibility condition to which the guidance in CrimPD 19A is applicable. 
Indeed, as prefaced above, the case law would appear to demonstrate that the Court of Appeal had 
begun to develop and apply a distinct common law reliability test several years before CrimPD 19A 
came into force. For example, in R v Reed34, the Court of Appeal, stating that “expert evidence of a 
scientific nature is not admissible where the scientific basis on which it is advanced is insufficiently 
reliable for it to be put before the jury”, held that an expert witness could not give “admissible 
evidence that expressed an opinion that the appellants were handling…knives when they broke” 
because “there was no reliable scientific basis for her to be able to express a view on the use the 
appellants made of the knives as opposed to the circumstances of transfer of their DNA”.35  In R v 
Broughton36, the Court of Appeal considered that the test that the judge had applied, namely, 
“whether there appeared to be a risk that the evidence might be unreliable so that it would 
potentially mislead the jury rather than help them” was “too low” but, having applied “a higher test 
                                                          
31 Above n.14 
32 Ward, T. “A new and more rigorous approach” to Expert Evidence in England and Wales (2015) International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof, 19(4), 228-245, at 235.  
33 ibid. at 234  
34 Above n.20 
35 ibid. at [102] 
36 [2010] EWCA Crim 549 
than that applied by the judge”37, held that the Low Template DNA evidence that the case concerned 
was sufficiently reliable to be admissible in evidence.  In R v T38, the Court of Appeal, applying the 
principles stated in Reed, held in the context of footwear mark evidence that “there [was] not a 
sufficiently reliable basis for an expert to be able to express an opinion based on the use of a 
mathematical formula”39.  And, in R v Dlugosz40, the Court of Appeal, applying R v Reed41 and R v T42, 
held that in the context of DNA evidence, “the fact that there is no reliable statistical basis does not 
mean that a court cannot admit an evaluative opinion, provided there is some other sufficiently 
reliable basis for its admission”43,  but also made clear that, [i]f the admissibility is challenged, the 
judge must…scrutinise the experience of the expert and the features of the profile so as to be 
satisfied as to the reliability of the basis on which the evaluative opinion is being given”.44 
 
It is therefore submitted that the requirement that expert opinion evidence must have a “sufficiently 
reliable scientific basis” (and presumably a “sufficiently reliable basis” for non-scientific expert 
opinion evidence) now constitutes a distinct admissibility criteria. Much then must turn on the 
interpretation of the “ordinary” test of reliability, how this test is affected by the incorporation of a 
“sufficient reliability” criterion and how rigorously this requirement is applied in practice. In the 
absence of appellate court jurisprudence on this matter since the introduction of the amended Part 
19 CrimPR and CrimPD 19A it remains a moot point as to what extent this development will affect 
the approach of the courts. It is however further submitted that these changes provide a clear 
opportunity for more rigorous challenge of expert opinion evidence on the basis of (insufficient) 
reliability and for exclusion of evidence which cannot demonstrably meet the required standard.   
Accepting that a distinct reliability test to which the guidance in CrimPD 19A relates now effectively 
exists at common law, it is then important to note that the Law Commission had not intended its 
proposals to result in reliability investigations every time expert opinion evidence was tendered by a 
party to criminal proceedings. Rather, its intention was that the reliability limb of its admissibility 
test would only come into play if, either, a party raised the issue of reliability and it appeared to the 
court that the evidence might not be sufficiently reliable to be admissible or, exceptionally, the court 
of its own motion raised the issue as a condition of admissibility.  Whilst the Law Commission’s 
                                                          
37 ibid.  
38 Above n.28 
39 ibid. at [86]  
40 n.14 
41 n.20 
42 n.28  
43 n.14 at [9] 
44 ibid. at [24] 
recommendations were not enacted, it is suggested that the Law Commission’s intended approach 
is, essentially, in line with the existing jurisprudence concerning the approach that the court should 
take prior to requiring a party to criminal proceedings to prove the admissibility of expert evidence. 
Thus, the Court of Appeal has indicated that “unless the admissibility is challenged, the judge will 
admit [the] evidence…However, if objection to the admissibility is made, then it is for the party 
proffering the evidence to prove its admissibility”45.  Prior to such a challenge being made, experts’ 
reports complying with the requirements imposed by CrimPR 19.4 should have been served by the 
parties, the parties should have analysed them, brought any disagreement to the attention of the 
court (at the Plea and Case Management Hearing if the reports have been served by the time when 
it takes place) and the court, in the exercise of its powers under CrimPR 19.6, should have directed 
the experts to discuss the expert issues and prepare a reasoned statement indicating the areas of 
agreement and disagreement.46 
Relevance  
As with evidence in general, in order to be admissible expert evidence must be relevant to an issue 
in the proceedings, which means that it must be “logically probative or disprobative of some matter 
that requires proof”47.  Effective pre-trial case management is crucial in enabling the court to identify 
the issues in relation to which expert evidence is relevant and should assist the court to apply the 
various limbs of the common law admissibility test to such evidence.48  Where expert evidence is 
admitted, effective case management should ensure that experts are not permitted to wander into 
“unnecessary, complicated and confusing detail”, that evidence in chief, cross-examination, re-
examination, submissions and speeches to the jury focus upon the relevant issues and that the 
judge’s summing up identifies for the jury the expert evidence which is probative or disprobative of 
those issues.49  A key provision of the CrimPR in this regard is the power in CrimPR 19.6 to direct pre-
hearing discussions of expert evidence, which was referred to above.  
Information likely to be outside the court’s knowledge and experience. 
The fact that expert evidence is relevant to an issue in the proceedings does not in itself render such 
evidence admissible, relevance being “a condition precedent to admissibility”.50  Rather, expert 
                                                          
45 Per Thomas LJ in Reed v Reed, above, n.20 at [113] 
46 See Thomas LJ in Reed v Reed, above, n.20 at [131-132], Thomas LJ in R v C [2010] EWCA Crim 2578 at [38-
41] and Moses LJ in R v Henderson [2010] 2 Cr App R 24  at [209-212]. 
47 Lord Simon of Glaisdale in DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 723 at 756, applied in the context of expert evidence 
by the Court of Appeal in R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 3 per Rose LJ at [33].   
48 See Moses LJ in R v Henderson, above n.46 at [205-206]. 
49 ibid. at [205] and [214-215]. 
50 Lawton LJ in R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 841 
evidence is only admissible if it provides the court with “information which is likely to be outside the 
experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their 
own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary”51.  The Law 
Commission, which referred to this limb of the common law admissibility test as the “assistance” 
requirement, believed that it ensured that “expert evidence is admitted only when it has sufficient 
probative value, in the sense that the evidence is likely to help the court resolve a disputed issue” 
but that all that was required in order for expert evidence to be “necessary” in this “limited sense 
was “that it has to provide helpful information which is likely to be outside a judge or jury’s 
knowledge and experience.”52   
The Law Commission’s draft Bill required that in order for expert evidence to be admissible “the 
court is satisfied that it would provide information which is likely to be outside a judge or jury’s 
experience and knowledge, and which would give them help they need in arriving at their 
conclusions”53.  Whilst recommending codification of all limbs of the common law admissibility test, 
the Law Commission (accepting that its practical application could occasionally be problematic) 
believed that the assistance limb was fundamentally sound and, following consultation, believed 
that no change to the test was required.54  Moreover, nothing either in the recent revisions to the 
CrimPR or in the new Practice Direction relates to the operation of the assistance limb of the 
admissibility test.  
The operation of this limb of the common law admissibility test does not only have the potential to 
exclude expert evidence in its entirety but also has the potential to limit the evidence which an 
expert witness should be permitted to give. Thus, where expert evidence is admitted, the expert 
should not be permitted to give evidence which does not inform the jury of scientific or medical 
experience of which it is unaware but merely amounts to common sense comment on the factual 
evidence, and such comment should not be included in an expert’s report, as this usurps the 
function of the jury.55   Indeed, in R v H56 the judge properly declined to admit the expert evidence of 
a retired psychiatrist and psychotherapist, much of whose evidence “amounted to no more than a 
comment on the complainant's credibility and reliability”, because “the way in which [the expert] 
had formulated her opinion required the judge to untangle what was of assistance to the jury and 
                                                          
51 ibid.  
52 Law Commission, above n. 3 at [2.3-2.5], [2.17]. 
53 ibid. at 146 (see cl.1(1)(a) of the Law Commission’s draft Bill). 
54 ibid. at [3.126] and [4.6] 
55 See R v H [2014] EWCA Crim 1555 per Leveson P at [26], [42] and [44]. 
56 ibid.  
what was confusing and inadmissible comment”57.  Moreover, the Privy Council, recognising the 
dangers of experts expressing opinions as “unalterable truths” on matters that are central to the 
jury’s decision, recently suggested that, as a general rule, experts should only be asked to state 
opinions on ultimate issues in circumstances in which this would provide substantial assistance to 
the tribunal of fact58. 
Competence to give expert evidence 
In order for a witness to be competent to give expert evidence, “the witness…must be peritus; he 
must be skilled”59 in the relevant field of expertise, though the common law does not require that 
the witness “must have become peritus in the way of his business or in any definite way”.60  In its 
draft Bill, the Law Commission provided that “a person may be qualified to give expert evidence by 
virtue of study, training, experience or any other appropriate means”61.  The Law Commission 
believed that what it termed the “relevant expertise” limb of the common law admissibility test was 
fundamentally sound and following consultation, whilst it recommended codification, believed that 
no change to the test was required.62   
An example of an area in which issues of competence may commonly be encountered in practice is 
provided by expert evidence given by current or former police officers/police employees. It has long 
been recognised that, “there is no question of a police officer being prevented from giving evidence 
as an expert if the subject in which he is giving evidence as an expert is a subject in which he has 
expert knowledge, and if it is restricted and directed to the issues in the case.”63  It is important, 
however, that where a police officer is to be called to give expert evidence, “the ordinary threshold 
requirements for expertise are established [and] the ordinary rules as to the giving of expert 
evidence are observed”64.  For example, in R v Hodges65, a police officer was properly permitted to 
give evidence as to the usual method of supplying heroin, the purchase price of heroin and that the 
amount of heroin found on the accused on arrest was more than he would have required for 
personal use. The officer, who had previously worked undercover but was now a drugs liaison 
officer, had over 16 years’ experience as a drugs officer, currently saw all forensic science service 
drugs reports that came into his police Division and his expertise in relation to the matters which his 
                                                          
57 ibid. at [40]  
58 Pora v The Queen [2016] 1 Cr. App. R. 3 
59 R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766, 771 
60 ibid.  
61 Law Commission, above, n.3 at 146 (see cl.2(1) of the Law Commission’s draft Bill). 
62 ibid. at [3.126] and [4.6] 
63 R v Oakley (1980) 70 Cr App R 7 per Lord Widgery CJ at 9. 
64 Myers v R [2015] UKPC 40 per Lord Hughes at [57]. 
65 [2003] 2 Cr. App. R. 15 
evidence concerned had been derived from training videos, from a drugs investigation course, from 
observations he had carried out, from speaking to prisoners, informants, colleagues and buyers and 
sellers of drugs and from police items recovered via drugs seizures. In contrast, an example of 
circumstances in which the opinion evidence given by a police witness fell outside the ambit of the 
witness’s established expertise  is provided by in R (on the application of Wright) v the Crown 
Prosecution Service66.  In Wright, a case concerning whether mushrooms which the accused 
admitted he had picked in October were “magic mushrooms”67, the Administrative Court held that 
CV Forster (a grade lower than police officer) should not have been permitted to give evidence 
identifying the mushrooms as magic mushrooms. The evidence had been based on Mr Foster’s 
physical examination of the mushrooms but there was no evidence indicating how he had 
distinguished them from the few other varieties of mushroom which he said looked like magic 
mushrooms, there was no “provenance” for his evidence that the growing season for magic 
mushrooms was July to August/September and there was no evidence that he possessed “any 
background” entitling him to testify that in consequence of global warming the growing season 
could extend into October. 
Once the court is satisfied that a witness is competent to give expert evidence in the relevant field, 
the weight of the witness’ evidence “is entirely a question for the jury, who will attach more or less 
weight to it according as they believe the witness to be peritus”68. For example, the fact that a 
recently retired former police officer called by the prosecution to give expert evidence relating to a 
police operated speed detection laser device had received recent training in the use of such devices 
and had used them in the recent past did not mean that a former police officer called by the defence 
who had retired eight years earlier, had not had the same training (because the training was not 
available to defence experts) and had not used such devices since he retired was not an expert 
witness. The latter witness had conducted continuing research into the device and did have 
experience of similar devices. The Divisional Court held that these matters went to the comparative 
weight of the expert evidence, not to the competence of the latter witness to give expert evidence69.  
The operation of the “relevant expertise” limb of the common law admissibility test does not only 
have the potential to exclude expert evidence but also has the potential to limit the evidence which 
an expert witness should be permitted to give. Thus, where expert evidence is admitted, the expert 
                                                          
66 [2015] EWHC 628 (Admin) 
67 Specifically Psilocybin mushrooms, a type of wild mushroom which, when consumed, produce hallucinogenic 
effects. Psilocybin mushrooms are prohibited in the United Kingdom and listed as a “Class A” drug  under the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971,  
68 Above n.59 at 771 
69 R (On the application of Doughty) v Ely Magistrates’ Court [2008] EWHC 522 (Admin) 
should still not be permitted to give evidence which falls outside the witness’ field of expertise. For 
example, in R v Clarke70, the Court of Appeal accepted that the judge had been entitled to rule that 
an expert in osteoarticular pathology who had never conducted a post mortem where murder was 
suspected did not possess the expertise to give an opinion on cause of death in a murder trial. The 
judge had not permitted the expert to stray outside of his field of expertise, though had properly 
permitted the expert to give evidence concerning matters within his field of expertise, such as how 
long before the victim’s death the fractures to the victim’s ribs had occurred. Conversely, the expert 
in Wright71 should not have strayed from the area of valuation of drugs to those of identification of 
mushrooms as magic mushrooms, the duration of the magic mushroom growing season and the 
consequences of global warming thereupon.  
CrimPR Part 19 contains several provisions which are of relevance in relation to expert witness 
competence, the expert’s field of expertise and the credibility of expert witnesses. Some of these 
provisions were introduced or amended in 2014, subsequent to the Government’s response to the 
Law Commission’s recommendations.  
CrimPR 19.4(a) requires experts, in their reports, to provide details of “qualifications, relevant 
experience and accreditation”. This will clearly provide information of assistance when the court is 
determining whether the witness is competent to give expert evidence.  
CrimPR 19.2, which concerns the expert’s duty to the court, contains several provisions which 
specifically relate to an expert’s field of expertise. It provides that an expert’s duty to the court 
includes, amongst other matters, an obligation to give an opinion which falls “within the expert’s 
area or areas of expertise”, an obligation, both in an expert’s report and when testifying, “to define 
the expert’s area or areas of expertise” and an obligation, when testifying, “to draw the court’s 
attention to any question to which the answer would be outside the expert’s area or areas of 
expertise”72.   
Finally, CrimPR 19.3(c) requires an expert who wishes to introduce an expert’s evidence other than 
as an admitted fact to “serve with the report notice of anything of which the party serving it is aware 
which might reasonably be thought capable of detracting substantially from the credibility of that 
expert”. It is suggested that examples of matters which a party should disclose in order to comply 
with this requirement are provided by those matters that prosecution experts are required to 
disclose to the prosecution when they complete the Expert Witnesses Self-Certificate contained in 
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Appendix C to the Crown Prosecution Service’s Guidance Booklet for Experts.73  The relevant matters 
include previous convictions, cautions and penalty notices, criminal or civil proceedings pending 
against the expert, adverse findings made by judges, magistrates or coroners concerning the expert’s 
professional competence or credibility, adverse findings by professional or regulatory bodies, 
pending proceedings, referrals or investigations by such bodies and any other information which 
may adversely affect the expert’s professional competence and credibility. Perhaps a useful 
amendment either to CrimPR 19.3(c) or to CrimPD 19A which might assist parties when determining 
what matters should be disclosed under this requirement would be the addition of examples of 
matters which might be relevant to credibility along the lines of those that prosecution experts are 
required to disclose. 
Determining reliability in the context of CrimPD 19A 
As was indicated above, CrimPD 19A.4 extracts from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v 
Dlugosz74  the proposition that “in determining the issue of admissibility, the court must be satisfied 
that there is a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for the evidence to be admitted. If there is then the 
court leaves the opposing views to be tested before the jury”.75 The Practice Direction then 
recognises that “nothing at common law precludes assessment by the court of the reliability of an 
expert opinion by reference to substantially similar factors to those the Law Commission 
recommended as conditions of admissibility” and encourages the courts to “actively enquire into 
such factors”.76 CrimPD 19A.5 (reproducing what the Law Commission referred to as its “lower-order 
factors”77) then indicates that the factors that the court may consider when determining reliability 
(and especially that of “expert scientific opinion”) include, 
 
(a) the extent and quality of the data on which the expert’s opinion is based, and the validity 
of the methods by which they were obtained;  
(b) if the expert’s opinion relies on an inference from any findings, whether the opinion 
properly explains how safe or unsafe the inference is (whether by reference to statistical 
significance or in other appropriate terms);  
(c) if the expert’s opinion relies on the results of the use of any method (for instance, a test, 
measurement or survey), whether the opinion takes proper account of matters, such as the 
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degree of precision or margin of uncertainty, affecting the accuracy or reliability of those 
results;  
(d) the extent to which any material upon which the expert’s opinion is based has been 
reviewed by others with relevant expertise (for instance, in peer-reviewed publications), and 
the views of those others on that material;  
(e) the extent to which the expert’s opinion is based on material falling outside the expert’s 
own field of expertise;  
(f) the completeness of the information which was available to the expert, and whether the 
expert took account of all relevant information in arriving at the opinion (including 
information as to the context of any facts to which the opinion relates);  
(g) if there is a range of expert opinion on the matter in question, where in the range the 
expert’s own opinion lies and whether the expert’s preference has been properly explained; 
and  
(h) whether the expert’s methods followed established practice in the field and, if they did 
not, whether the reason for the divergence has been properly explained. 
 
The Law Commission intended that on a case by case basis the judge would select those factors that 
were appropriate in relation to the type of expert opinion evidence before the court, could take into 
account other factors that were not specifically listed and would not take into account factors that 
were not applicable.78 Perhaps CrimPD 19A should make clear that this is how the guidance it 
provides which is drawn from the Law Commission’s lower-order factors should be deployed.  
 
So far as factor (h), above is concerned, a footnote in the Law Commission’s Report makes clear that 
“[t]his factor should not in any way be understood as a presumption against the admission of expert 
opinion evidence based on new or nascent developments in science and technology” but that an 
expert whose opinion is based on such developments “should explain why an opinion founded on it 
is sound”.79 Indeed as identified above, prior to the introduction of CrimPD 19A, the Court of Appeal 
had emphasised on a number of occasions that the criminal courts should not be denied the 
advantages that such new developments can provide.80 Whilst the courts should in future adopt “a 
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more rigorous approach”81 when considering, in the light of the new Practice Direction, whether 
expert evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted in criminal proceedings, it is hoped that they 
will continue to recognise the potential advantages of new scientific and technological 
developments. The danger if the balance swings too far from the previous “laissez faire” approach to 
the admission of expert opinion evidence that the Law Commission intended to replace with its new 
admissibility test82 to a new approach of rigid enforcement of the common law reliability test is that,   
 
“a significant proportion of currently admissible techniques and expert opinions--that have 
presumably assisted in procuring convictions--would be inadmissible [and] some techniques 
that might eventually prove to be reliable will face delay before criminal courts accept them 
[which could] leave more serious offenders in our communities.”83 
 
It is suggested that an amendment to CrimPD 19A could usefully make clear that the guidance it 
contains is not intended to prevent the courts from admitting expert evidence based on new science 
or new technology provided that the court has undertaken a sufficiently rigorous examination of its 
reliability.  
 
As well as reproducing the Law Commission’s lower-order factors, CrimPD 19A84 also indicates that 
when the court is considering the reliability of expert opinion evidence (and especially that of 
scientific opinion) it “should be astute to identify potential flaws in such opinion which detract from 
its reliability”.85  CrimPD 19A.6 then reproduces the Law Commission’s “higher-order examples” of 
expert evidence which is insufficiently reliable to be admitted86, namely,  
 
(a) being based on a hypothesis which has not been subjected to sufficient scrutiny 
(including, where appropriate, experimental or other testing), or which has failed to stand 
up to scrutiny;  
(b) being based on an unjustifiable assumption;  
(c) being based on flawed data;  
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(d) relying on an examination, technique, method or process which was not properly carried 
out or applied, or was not appropriate for use in the particular case; or  
(e) relying on an inference or conclusion which has not been properly reached. 
 
The Law Commission believed that the combination of its higher-order examples and lower-order 
factors would both “direct the trial judge to matters which have a bearing on the question of 
evidentiary reliability in a particular case [and] explain what the reliability test means for the type of 
expert evidence being proffered for admission”.87 The reliability limb of the Law Commission’s 
proposed admissibility test in cl.1(2) of its draft Bill  would have provided that “expert opinion 
evidence is admissible in criminal proceedings only if it is sufficiently reliable to be admitted”.88 In 
determining whether this was so the Law Commission envisaged that its lower-order factors would 
be read in conjunction not only with the abovementioned reliability limb and its higher-order 
examples but also in conjunction with the “core test” in cl. 4(1).89  This core test would have 
provided that “[e]xpert opinion evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted if—(a) the opinion is 
soundly based, and (b) the strength of the opinion is warranted having regard to the grounds on 
which it is based”.90 The core test is not referred to by CrimPD 19A. It is suggested that adding the 
core test to the matters stated in CrimPD 19A to which the court is entitled to refer when applying 
the common law reliability test would enhance the utility of the Practice Direction. However, even 
though the core test is not reproduced in the Practice Direction, there is presumably no reason why 
a court could not treat the Law Commission’s core test as additional guidance to assist it when 
considering whether expert opinion has a sound basis the strength of which is warranted with 
regards to the grounds which form its basis in order to assist it when applying the common law 
reliability test.   
 
Another omission from CrimPD 19A when compared to the Law Commission’s draft Bill is a specific 
indication that apart from the lower-order factors that are reproduced in CrimPD 19A.5 the court 
should also consider “anything else which appears to the court to be relevant”.91 It is assumed that 
whilst CrimPD 19A does not specifically make this clear, this does in fact reflect the ethos underlying 
the new Practice Direction.  
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Whilst the common law test is stated in Dlugosz92 in terms of there being a sufficiently reliable 
“scientific” basis to justify the admission of the relevant evidence, the Law Commission had intended 
its proposed reliability test to be applicable both to scientific and to non-scientific (experience 
based) expert opinion evidence.93 The Law Commission recognised, however, that whilst it might 
occasionally be necessary to apply its reliability test to non-scientific evidence it would often be 
unnecessary to do so and that in many cases the only issue with such evidence would be whether 
the witness possessed the requisite skill.94 The Practice Direction seems to implicitly recognise that 
the guidance that it provides extends beyond the realm of scientific evidence but is primarily 
relevant to scientific evidence where it states that, “factors which the court may take into account in 
determining the reliability of expert opinion, and especially of expert scientific opinion, include…”.95 
An amendment to CrimPD 19A making it clear that the guidance it reproduces is intended to be 
generic might make sense. 
 
So far as scientific (including medical) evidence is concerned, the Law Commission envisaged that in 
order to satisfy its reliability test, 
 
“…any inference drawn by the expert must be expressed with no greater degree of precision 
or certainty than can be justified by the material supporting it. The onus will be on the party 
proffering the evidence, and the party’s experts, to refer to properly conducted empirical 
research (testing and observing) which substantiates the hypothesis and does not 
undermine it. The court will then consider whether the opinion evidence the expert wishes 
to provide (including its strength) is sufficiently reliable to be admitted, bearing in mind the 
extent and quality of the research, the margins of uncertainty in the findings, the extent of 
the data relied on, any “known unknowns” and, in particular, whether there is a plausible, 
alternative explanation for the findings.”96   
 
The Law Commission accepted, however, that whilst  
 
“…the underlying evidence supporting the hypothesis and the chain of reasoning 
underpinning the opinion would always need to be scientifically valid…the required extent to 
which there has been scientific research and the required extent of the corroborative data 
                                                          
92 Above n.14 
93 Law Commission, above, n.3 at [3.40-3.64]. 
94 ibid. at [5.71-5.72].  
95 CrimPD 19A.5. 
96 Law Commission, above, n.3 at [5.66].  
supporting a hypothesis will depend on the nature and strength of the opinion and the 
extent to which it is qualified.”97 
 
With regard to non-scientific evidence, the Law Commission, taking the example of lip-reading 
evidence, indicated that in the occasional circumstances in which it would be necessary to apply the 
reliability test (as opposed to the relevant expertise test) to such evidence, it would be necessary “to 
show that the lip-reader’s methodology, or the way the expert applied his or her skill for the instant 
case, provides sufficient evidence of reliability to justify his or her opinion evidence being placed 
before the jury”.98 The Law Commission accepted that,  
 
“Factors such as line-of-sight, facial hair, regional accents and lighting may have a bearing on 
the reliability of a lip-reader’s interpretation. If the angle of observation and the lighting 
were poor, and the fundamental issue is whether the observed person said just one or a few 
key words, then the lip-reader’s evidence could be insufficiently reliable to be admitted in a 
given case.”99 
 
The Law Commission intended that the assistance, relevant expertise and impartiality limbs of its 
admissibility test would apply to all expert evidence whereas the reliability limb would only apply to 
expert opinion evidence.100 It recognised that R v Meads101 provided authority for the proposition 
that the common law admissibility criteria only apply to expert opinion evidence and not to expert 
evidence of fact but also that the existing case law almost exclusively relates to expert opinion 
evidence. The Law Commission contrasted, the situation where a police officer was called to give 
factual evidence (such as evidence of paraphernalia that drug-dealers commonly use) from that in 
which a police officer was called to give expert opinion evidence (such as whether the quantity of 
drugs found in the accused’s possession exceeded that required for personal consumption).102 In the 
former situation, the Law Commission’s reliability test would not have been applicable and the issue 
so far as the admissibility of the expert’s factual evidence was concerned would simply have been 
whether the police officer “was qualified to provide expert evidence, with reference to information 
such as the number of recent cases involving drugs he or she has worked on, the nature and extent 
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of his or her involvement, the courses and seminars attended and so on”.103 In the latter situation 
the Law Commission’s reliability limb would potentially have been applicable and if it had been 
applied it would have been necessary both to show that the police officer was “qualified to provide 
an expert opinion on such matters” and to show that the police officer’s “opinion was based on 
sound empirical research and that the strength of the opinion was warranted by the data relied on 
and the inferences legitimately to be drawn from the data”.104   
 
For present purposes, the crucial question is to what extent the three limbs of the common law 
admissibility test and/or the common law reliability test would be applicable in the context of the 
Law Commission’s two police officer scenarios. CrimPD 19A refers to three common law limbs in 
terms of the admissibility of “expert opinion evidence” and to the guidance it adopted from the Law 
Commissions draft Bill in terms of “expert opinion” and “expert scientific opinion”.105 This would 
suggest that, in line with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Meads106, the three limbs of the 
common law admissibility test and the common law reliability test would be inapplicable to the Law 
Commission’s former scenario but would apply to the latter. The decision in Meads107 (which 
concerned factual evidence of tests performed by handwriting experts into whether police officers 
could have written handwritten notes in the time in which they had allegedly been written) has, 
however, been subject to criticism, including criticism by the Law Commission itself.108 Whilst 
Meads109 has been applied by the Divisional Court110, it is suggested that the better approach to 
admissibility at common law would be that, at the very least, the three traditional limbs of the 
common law admissibility test should be applicable to evidence such as that encountered in the 
former of the Law Commission’s two police officer scenarios. It may be that this is a matter that the 
Court of Appeal should revisit. If expert evidence of fact was treated as falling within the ambit of 
the common law admissibility test but not within that of the new common law reliability test, the 
sole live issue in the former of the Law Commission’s scenarios would be whether the police witness 
was competent to give such evidence whereas in the latter scenario reliability would also, 
potentially, become a live issue.  
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The requirements of CrimPR 19.4 concerning the content of experts’ reports require the provision of 
information some of which should be of value when the court is required to determine the reliability 
of expert evidence. For example, the report must provide details of the literature etc relied upon by 
the expert, set out the substance of the facts on which the expert’s opinion is based, clarify which 
facts fall within the expert’s personal knowledge, identify those who carried out tests and 
experiments etc (detailing the qualifications etc of such persons), summarise the range of opinion in 
the area (if there is such  a range) providing reasons for the opinion formed by the expert and if the 
opinion is a qualified opinion, state that this is so.111 The requirement imposed by CrimPR 19.4 which 
most obviously concerns the reliability of expert evidence is that imposed by an amendment to the 
CrimPR made by the CrimPRC following a request made by the Government in its response to the 
Law Commission’s Report112, namely, that an expert’s report must “include such information as the 
court may need to decide whether the expert’s opinion is sufficiently reliable to be admissible as 
evidence”.113 The Crown Prosecution Service Guidance on Expert Evidence suggests that when an 
expert is considering what to include in a report in order to comply with this new requirement the 
expert should have regard to the guidance provided by the Practice Direction.114 It is suggested that 
guidance to this effect could usefully be added either to CrimPR 19.4 itself or to CrimPD 19A.  
 
The Law Commission did not believe that its proposed evidentiary reliability test would have 
provided “a panacea”.115 It believed, however, that the problems that been encountered in the 
United States of America116 in relation to the application of the Daubert117 reliability test, which is 
now codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702118, would not be replicated if its recommended 
reliability test was implemented in England and Wales. This it believed was so because the courts 
would have had the benefit of the guidance provided by its higher-order examples and lower-order 
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factors, judges would have received practical training, the reliability test would have been policed by 
the Court of Appeal, judges would (under its recommendations) have been entitled to call on 
additional expertise in complex cases and its recommended amendments to the CrimPR would have 
ensured that all relevant material was available to the judge.119 In particular, the Law Commission 
emphasised “the importance of training, both for lawyers and the judiciary, and the need for a more 
proactive, enquiring approach to expert opinion evidence in criminal proceedings”.120 Edmond 
suggests, however, that the Law Commission “overstated” the differences between its proposals and 
the positions in the United States of America because the Daubert121 test includes criteria to assist 
the court in assessing reliability, lawyers and judges in the United States of America also receive 
education and training, the Court of Appeal might not quash a conviction and order a retrial if the 
case against the accused is compelling even if the expert evidence ought not to have been admitted 
and  the courts in the United States rarely exercise their powers to appoint expert witnesses to assist 
them.122 Edmond also suggests, with reference to the difficulty of  dealing with “varying degrees of 
technical and methodological sophistication (and illiteracy) [which] limit the ability to comprehend 
and adapt”, that “[i]t is far from obvious that training, even training based around conventional legal 
values, will facilitate the kinds of changes that appear to be required”.123 In practice, the 
recommendation that the court should possess the power to appoint an expert to assist it in 
complex cases124 has not been implemented, the extent, quality and efficacy of the training provided 
for judges and lawyers remains to be seen and at the time of writing, it remains to be seen what the 
approach of the Court of Appeal to the application of the reliability of the common law reliability 




Under the Law Commission’s recommended admissibility test, if it appeared to the court that there 
was a significant risk that an expert would not or had not complied with the expert’s duty to the 
court to give objective and unbiased evidence, the expert’s evidence would not have been 
admissible unless the court was satisfied that its admission was in the interests of justice, though the 
fact that the expert had an association, such as an employment relationship, which might have made 
a reasonable observer think that the expert might not so comply would not in itself have 
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demonstrated a significant risk.125 The Law Commission regarded this provision as codifying an 
existing limb of the common law admissibility test which it regarded as fundamentally sound, though 
it accepted that its view was based on civil jurisprudence due to the lack of criminal authorities in 
this area and that its recommendations might “be slightly different from the common law position 
for criminal proceedings”.126 In fact, the criminal authorities in this area provide no authority for the 
proposition that impartiality forms a limb of the common law admissibility test (and, indeed, CrimPD 
19A, when summarising the limbs of the common law admissibility test, does not mention 
impartiality). Rather, the position in criminal proceedings is that  
 
“[e]xpertise and independence are separate issues [it being] a matter for the jury to 
determine whether there [is] any conscious or unconscious bias or lack of objectivity that 
might render [an expert’s] evidence unreliable [this being] a matter going to weight rather 
than admissibility”.127 
 
Whilst impartiality does not amount to a limb of the common law admissibility test, CrimPR Part 19 
makes clear, amongst other matters, that the expert’s duty to the court, which overrides the 
expert’s obligation to the person instructing or paying the expert, includes the duty to give evidence 
which is “objective and unbiased”.128 Moreover, CrimPR 19.4(j) provides that an expert’s report must 
“contain a statement that the expert understands an expert’s duty to the court, and has complied 
and will continue to comply with that duty”.  
 
The current approach in civil proceedings as regards impartiality is that 
 
[i]t is always a matter for the court to decide whether…connections [between the expert 
and the litigation or the litigating parties] disqualify the expert from giving evidence or 
whether, as will often be the case, they go not to the admissibility of the evidence but to the 
weight to be attached to it.129  
 
The key question that the civil court must determine when deciding whether an expert who has 
some form of interest in the outcome of civil proceedings should be permitted to give expert 
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evidence in those proceedings is “whether…he or she is aware of their primary duty to the Court if 
they give expert evidence, and willing and able, despite the interest or connection with the litigation 
or a party thereto, to carry out that duty”.130 Whilst the Law Commission regarded civil 
jurisprudence as providing authority for the existence of a common law admissibility limb based on 
impartiality131, it does not seem to have recognised  that the admissibility of expert evidence in civil 
proceedings is governed not by the common law but by statute132 and, more significantly, it does not 
appear to have taken into account the fact that, under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), the civil 
courts possess powers both to restrict expert evidence133 and to exclude evidence that would 
otherwise be admissible134 that their criminal counterparts do not possess.  
 
Whilst impartiality does not form a distinct limb of the common law admissibility test and the case 
management powers conferred on the criminal courts by CrimPR Part 19 are less extensive than 
those conferred on their civil counterparts by CPR Part 35, there do appear to be at least two 
possible routes via which a criminal court could potentially exclude expert evidence solely or 
partially in consequence of bias on the part of an expert witness.  First, there seems to be no reason 
why a criminal court in the exercise of its exclusionary discretion under s.78 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act would not be entitled to exclude expert evidence tendered by the prosecution 
which was so tainted by bias that a civil court would have excluded it on the basis that admitting the 
evidence would have such an adverse on the fairness of the proceedings that it ought not to be 
admitted. Indeed, the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Luttrell135 (whilst not concerning 
impartiality) made clear that the court is entitled to exclude expert evidence tendered by the 
prosecution in order to secure the fairness of the proceedings. Similarly, in R v Dlugosz (again 
admittedly not in the context of impartiality) the Court of Appeal made clear that if there is a danger 
that a jury might “attach a false or misleading impression” to expert evidence, “then, even though 
admissible, the court should decline to admit it under its powers under s.78 of PACE”.136 
 
The s.78 option would not be available to the judge where the tainted evidence was tendered by the 
defence because s.78 only applies to prosecution evidence. Consequently, arguments aimed at 
excluding defence expert evidence on the basis of bias would have to be targeted via one or more of 
the limbs of the common law admissibility test and/or the common law reliability test. Unless the 
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evidence was so tainted by bias as to have no probative value it would presumably be difficult to 
justify its exclusion it on the basis of irrelevance. Similarly, if the evidence possessed more than 
minimal probative value it would be difficult to assert purely on the basis of bias either that it was 
incapable of providing the jury with some assistance in resolving issues outside of its knowledge and 
experience of that its maker did not possess sufficient skill in the relevant field of expertise to be 
competent to give expert evidence. Thus, it may be that the most viable approach would be to 
assert (in circumstances where this was so) that in consequence of bias there was not a sufficiently 
reliable scientific basis for expert opinion evidence to be admitted (an argument which, of course, 
could equally be applied to expert evidence tendered by the prosecution).  
 
So far as the US Daubert137 reliability test, codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702, is concerned, 
David Bernstein suggested that the “implicit rationale for the reliability test is to preserve the 
perceived advantages of the adversarial system while mitigating the harms to the courts' truth-
seeking function by the inevitable and strong biases that accompany adversarial expert 
testimony”.138 Bernstein believes, however, that the Daubert test “far from fully succeeds in 
efficiently achieving this goal” and believes that Rule 702 and the “Daubert trilogy”139 took a “wrong 
turn” by “insisting that judges attempt to discern the underlying reliability of proffered expert 
testimony in a given case” rather than focussing “on whether the testimony reflects unbiased, 
nonpartisan opinion within the expert witness's legitimate field of expertise”.140  
 
In its final Report, the Law Commission deliberately avoided including factors relating to expertise or 
impartiality in the reliability limb of its admissibility test in order to avoid judges being required to 
apply distinct tests which overlapped.141 In its original Consultation Paper, however, the Law 
Commission had included in its lists of guidelines relating to scientific and experience based expert 
opinion evidence the factor “whether there is evidence to suggest that the expert witness has failed 
to act in accordance with his or her overriding duty of impartiality”.142 Given that the Law 
Commission’s recommended impartiality limb does not exist at common law, the potential overlap 
between reliability and impartiality limbs that persuaded the Law Commission not to include an 
impartiality factor in its lower-order factors is not an issue. Thus there would seem to be no reason 
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why the criminal courts could not take the impartiality factor from the Law Commission’s 
Consultation Paper into account as guidance when applying the common law reliability test. Indeed, 
it is arguable that alleged bias could also be relevant to the application of the common law reliability 
test when the Court is considering, in line with the guidance provided by CrimPD 19A.5, whether an 
expert took full account of all relevant information, whether an expert’s preference from a range of 
opinion relating to the relevant matter has been properly explained and/or whether an expert’s 
divergence from established practice in the field has been properly explained.143 
 
It is not suggested that recourse to the common law reliability test as a means of challenging the 
impartiality of an expert witness is something that should be attempted regularly. Fundamentally, as 
Michell and Mandhane recognised,  
 
courts should not be too quick to find bias on the part of expert witnesses…  
[Partisanship] should be discouraged, but [conflict between expert testimony] may reflect a 
genuine divergence of opinion amongst experts, which is essential to the adversarial 
process.144   
 
Thus, even if the courts become willing to consider arguments based on bias when considering 
whether expert opinion evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted, it may be that they should  
not be too willing to do so.  
 
Whilst it is possible to speculate that the criminal courts might be persuaded to exclude expert 
evidence which is tainted by bias either under s.78 or on the basis of unreliability, currently the main 
option for counsel who wishes to challenge expert evidence in criminal proceedings upon the basis 
of bias would appear to remain that of developing an appropriate cross-examination strategy. In 
order to do so it is important to recognise that bias may have a variety of causes. A valuable analysis 
of the causes of expert witness bias was provided by Deidre Dwyer, who identified three categories, 
namely, “personal interest, financial interest and intellectual interest”.145 Whilst Dwyer’s analysis 
was directed at the civil context, most of the causes of expert witness bias she identifies are clearly 
relevant in the context of criminal proceedings. Dwyer subdivided the personal interest category 
into “personal predisposition” (encompassing moral opinions, personal relationships, common 
memberships and other professional relationships) and “personal involvement (i.e. the expert 
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developing sympathy for the instructing party).146 Dwyer subdivided the financial interest category 
into “financial predisposition” (encompassing expert as shareholders, experts as employees and 
developing a future career as an expert) and “financial involvement” (i.e. the fact that the expert is 
being paid by one of the parties).147 Finally, the intellectual interest category concerns the potential 
for bias where an expert’s standing in the expert’s profession may be increased or reduced 
depending upon the court’s conclusions in relation to a method or theory in relation to which the 
expert is a leading authority.148   
 
With regard to potential cross-examination strategies, David Paciocco’s analysis is helpful149. 
Paciocco, whilst recognising that “[b]ias is notoriously difficult to prove” also believes that “[bias] has 
its high-risk contexts, practices and symptoms; these can and should be exposed during cross-
examination and, where a credible foundation is created, referred to in counsel's submissions”.150 
Thus, based on Paciocco’s work, a cross-examination strategy might, for example, be aimed at 
revealing “selection bias” (i.e. that a witness has been selected because the witness’ ideas align with 
the party’s interests), at questioning whether an expert witness has understood expert’s duty to the 
court, at exposing personal or professional bias or at exploring litigation influences (i.e. pressures) to 
which the witness was exposed by the instructing party.151  
 
Some of the forms of bias identified by Dwyer and considered by Paciocco might be less obvious 
either to the expert or to the party instructing the expert than others. It is suggested that a desirable 
amendment to the provisions of CrimPR Part 19 concerning expert’s duties in criminal proceedings 
would be elaboration concerning some of the key forms of bias that might be encountered in 
criminal proceedings which could have the effect of drawing to experts’ attention some of the less 
obvious forms of which they might not be aware but to which they might be prone. Moreover, it is 
suggested that a valuable amendment to CrimPD 19A might be to add to the list of lower-order 
factors which it reproduces from the Law Commission’s Report the impartiality factor that is to be 
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Following the Government’s decision not to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations 
concerning expert evidence in criminal proceedings, the admissibility of expert opinion evidence in 
criminal proceedings in England and Wales continues to be governed by a three limbed common law 
admissibility test which does not include an impartiality limb but now, it is suggested, is 
supplemented by a common law reliability test which has developed via recent jurisprudence of the 
Court of Appeal. The existence of a reliability test should not, however, be taken to suggest that the 
criminal courts will be required to conduct investigations into the admissibility of all expert evidence 
as a matter of routine. It should also be noted that, until the Court of Appeal further considers 
reliability in the context of the amendments to Part 19 CrimPR and CrimPD 19A, it is difficult to 
predict to what extent the court will use the opportunity to develop the common law reliability test.  
 
Expert evidence must be relevant and the court, taking appropriate case management steps, should 
ensure that where expert evidence is admitted the attention of the jury is focussed on the relevant 
issues. Moreover, such evidence should only be admitted if it provides information that is likely to be 
outside the court’s knowledge and experience and, again, the court should ensure that where an 
expert witness is called, expert opinion is restricted to issues in relation to which this test is satisfied.  
 
An expert witness must be competent to give expert evidence and where a witness is so competent 
the court should ensure that the witness is not permitted to give evidence which strays outside the 
witness’ field of expertise. Provisions of CrimPR Part 19 require the provision of information which 
should assist the court when it is determining the competence of a witness to give expert evidence, 
when it is evaluating the ambit of an expert’s field of expertise and when it is assessing the 
credibility of an expert witness and Part 19 also contains provisions which emphasise the duty of an 
expert to give evidence which falls within the ambit of the expert’s field of expertise. It is suggested 
that either the new credibility provision within CrimPR 19 itself or CrimPD 19A might beneficially be 
amended so as to provide parties with examples of the types of matter that they are required to 
disclose.  
 
The guidance contained in CrimPD 19A is intended to inform the application of the common law 
reliability test, as stated in R v Dlugosz152. The common law reliability test in Dlugosz was framed in 
terms of scientific evidence whereas the Law Commission intended its guidance to apply to both 
scientific and non-scientific expert evidence. Whilst the Practice Direction appears to recognise that 
the guidance it produces is applicable to expert evidence of both types, an amendment making clear 
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that the reliability test is generic might be of assistance. Moreover, the Practice Direction appears to 
accept that both the common law admissibility test which it reproduces and the guidance it imports 
from the Law Commission’s Report are both applicable to expert opinion evidence but do not apply 
when an expert gives evidence of fact. This appears to be in line with the very limited jurisprudence 
in relation to the issue but may be a matter that the Court of Appeal could usefully revisit. CrimPD 
19A reproduces the Law Commission’s “lower-order factors” and “higher-order examples” but fails 
to reproduce the Law Commission’s “core test”. It is suggested that amendment of the Practice 
Direction so as to encompass the core test as additional high level guidance which the courts could 
take into account when deciding whether expert evidence is sufficiently reliable would enhance the 
coherence of the Practice Direction and the utility of the guidance that it provides. It is suggested 
also that CrimPD 19A should be further amended to make clear both that the courts should, on a 
case by case basis, take into account only those of the Law Commission’s lower-order factors that 
are appropriate in relation to the type of expert opinion evidence which is before them and that as 
well as the lower-order factors the court should also consider any other factors that are relevant to 
evaluating the reliability of the expert evidence which is before them. Another potential amendment 
to the Practice Direction might be one making clear that the guidance it contains is not intended to 
prevent the courts from admitting expert evidence based on new science or new technology 
provided that the court has undertaken a sufficiently rigorous examination of its reliability. Several 
of the provisions of CrimPR Part 19 which concern the content of experts’ reports require experts to 
provide information which the court should find of value when required to evaluate the reliability of 
their evidence. In particular, experts are now required to provide the information that the court may 
require in order to apply the common law reliability test. It is suggested that both experts and the 
parties instructing them would be likely to value guidance concerning what is required in order to 
comply with that requirement and that such guidance should be made explicit either in CrimPR part 
19 itself or in CrimPD 19A. Moreover, whilst the Law Commission emphasised the importance of 
training for judges and lawyers as regards the application of its proposed reliability test, it remains to 
be seen both what training will be provided in relation to the application of the common law 
reliability test in the context of the guidance provided by CrimPD 19A and how successful that 
training will be.  
 
Finally, whilst impartiality does not appear to amount to a condition precedent to the admissibility 
of expert evidence in criminal proceedings, it is suggested that there are at least two routes via 
which a party to criminal proceedings could potentially deploy arguments based on alleged expert 
witness bias in attempting to persuade the court to exclude such evidence. First, there would seem 
to be no obvious reason why the court could not exclude expert evidence tendered by the 
prosecution in the exercise of its exclusionary discretion under s.78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 in circumstances in which a civil court would exercise its case management 
powers so as to exclude expert evidence in consequence of expert witness bias. Secondly, given that 
the common law admissibility test does not possess a discrete impartiality limb, there would seem to 
be no reason why the court could not take expert witness bias into account when applying the 
common law reliability test. Accepting, however, that the courts may not be prepared to exclude 
expert evidence on the basis of either of these two suggested routes, it remains important for 
counsel to be aware of the various forms that bias can take and, in circumstances in which expert 
evidence appears to be tainted by bias, to develop an appropriate cross-examination strategy. A final 
suggestion is that whilst CrimPR Part 19 clearly states the expert’s overriding duty to the court, it 
might be helpful for the rules to provide some examples of the various forms that bias can take in 
order to draw some of the less obvious forms to the attention both of experts and of the parties 
instructing them.  
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